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ABSTRACT
The market for ski runs or amusement rides often features lump—sum
admission tickets with no explicit price per ride. Therefore, the equation
of the demand for rides to the supply involves queues, which are
systematically longer during peak periods, such as weekends. Moreover, the
prices of admission tickets are much less responsive than the length of
queues to variations in demand, even when these variations are predictable.
We show that this method of pricing generates nearly efficient outcomes under
plausible conditions. In particular, the existence of queues and the
"stickiness" of prices do not necessarily mean that rides are allocated
improperly or that firms choose inefficient levels of investment. We then
draw an analogy between "ski—lift pricing" and the use of profit-sharing
schemes in the labor market. Although firms face explicit marginal costs of
labor that are sticky and less than workers' reservation wages, and although
the pool of profits seems to create a common—property problem for workers,
this method of pricing can approximate the competitive outcomes for
employment and total labor compensation.
Robert J. Barro Paul M. Romer
Department of Economics Department of Economics
University of Rochester University of Rochester
Rochester, NY 14627 Rochester, NY 14627During Christmas or Spring vacation, most ski areas have long lines. The
same is true for Disneyland and other amusement parks in peak season. This
type of crowding does not depend on surprises in demand, but instead is
systematic. Most economists look at chronic queuing and conjecture that the
suppliers would do better by raising prices. Further, most economists would
argue that the failure to price properly leads to inefficient allocations of
rides, as well as improper investment decisions. But the regular occurrence
of lines in some markets suggests that it is economists, rather than suppliers
(who have survived), who are missing something.
We argue in this paper that competitive suppliers of ski-lift services
(amusement rides, etc.) may rationally set prices so that queues occur
regularly and are longer at peak times. Under plausible assumptions, this
method of pricing can support efficient allocative decisions. In equilibrium,
owners of ski areas set prices for all-day lift tickets (or equivalently, for
admission tickets to amusement parks) by maximizing profits subject to a
downward-sloping demand curve. Yet this appearance of monopoly power leads to
no inefficiency. Moreover, the equilibrium price charged for a lift ticket
may not rise with expansions of demand. Sticky prices may be consistent with
optimization by suppliers and with efficient choices of quantities.
The explanation for this last result is that skiers calculate the
effective price per lift ride by summing opportunity costs, transportation
costs and the price of an all-day lift ticket, and then dividing this sum by
the number of rides received. This effective price varies inversely with the
number of skiers, and thereby changes in the correct direction with2
fluctuations in demand, even If the lift-ticket price is constant. Under
plausible conditions, the magnitude of response of the effective price is also
nearly "correct."
We go on to develop parallels between the ski-lift example and the labor
market. Fully flexible wages correspond to fully flexible prices per lift
ride. But, as In the case of skiing, it is possible to implement alternative
methods of pricing that support the efficient outcomes. We show as an example
that a profit-sharing scheme, such as that described in Weitzman (1985)
parallels the use of admission tickets. Further, under some conditions—and
without appealing to long-term contracts—there is little efficiency loss by
having sticky wages and fixed parameters of the profit-sharing formula.
In the ski-lift and labor-market examples, the contracts and trading
arrangements that agents use may depart significantly from the textbook
description of a competitive market. Stated prices may differ from marginal
values. Some agents may act explicitly as price setters facing finite
elasticities, while others may face explicit or implicit quantity constraints.
Without forcing a departure from these institutional conventions, competitive
forces may nonetheless induce efficient outcomes. To decide whether a market
is competitive or efficient, economists cannot accept at face value the
description offered by agents of how a market operates. The prices quoted In
actual contracts and trades may bear little relation to the theoretical
contructs that economists call competitive equilibrium prices.
2. The Suppy and Demand for Ski-Lift Services
We will show that the ski-area equilibrium with queues and sticky prices
for all-day lift tickets is essentially a repackaged or disguised version of a3
conventional equilibrium with a price per lift ride that adjusts in the usual
fashion. To do this, we analyze the conventional equilibrium first. Section
2.1 describes the market for ski-lift rides and works out the equilibrium.
Section 2.2 then illustrates how the quantities and prices from this efficient
solution can be replicated in an equilibrium with lift-ticket pricing and
queues. Section 2.3 considers the factors that might influence the choice
between these two institutional arrangements for supporting the equilibrium.
Section 2.4 illustrates why lift-ticket prices may not respoñd to changes in
demand. The results in these four subsections are derived under the
assumption that all ski areas are identical and that individuals differ only
In a limited sense. Section 3 shows how the results are modified with more
interesting heterogeneity across consumers and producers. Then Section 4
shows how a parallel analysis applies to profit-sharing schemes in the labor
market.
2.1 Equilibrium with Ride Tickets
Consider a group of identical, competitive ski-lift operators, each of
whom sells ride tickets at a price P per ride. Each firm has a fixed capacity
and therefore supplies inelastically the total quantity of rides x.
Flexibility in this quantity at some positive marginal cost is more realistic,
since suppliers can open more lift lines or perhaps operate the existing ones
at greater speed. But these modifications would not change the nature of the
problem. In the present case the industry's total supply of rides is Jx,
where J is the fixed number of firms.4
The demand for skiing involves first, the decision to participate—that
is, whether to go skiing—and second the quantity of rides to demand
contingent on participation. To abstract from income effects, suppose that
all individuals have common preferences that can be represented in the
quasi-linear form U(q) +z,where q is the number of lift rides, U is a
strictly concave utility function, and z is real expenditure on goods other
than skiing. For someone who chooses to ski, the expenditure on other goods
is z =Y-Pg-c,where Y is real income, Pq is the expenditure on lift
rides, and c is an individual specific, lump-sum cost of going skiing.It is
quasi-fixed in the sense that the cost for a non-skier is zero, but the cost
for a skier is Independent of the number of ski runs.
Since P is a price per ride, the quantity of rides demanded by those who
ski follows from the condition, U'(q,) =P.Inverting this equation, the
number of rides demanded per person appears as a usual demand curve with a
negative slope:q1 =D(P),with D'(P) <0.Since we assume in this section
that U is the same for all individuals, each person who participates demands
the same number of rides, q. Section 3 generalizes the results to allow for
cross-sectional differences in the demand curves for ski-lift rides.
An Individual participates if the net (money value) of the utility
gained, U[D(P)] -P.D(P),exceeds the fixed cost c.In order to neglect
Integer constraints, we assume that the agents In the economy can be
represented as a continuum [0,M}, arranged In terms of Increasing costs of
participating. We also want to allow the cost for all Individuals to vary
over time. Thus we describe the costs In terms of a family of cost functions
c(j), which are continuous and strictly Increasing In agent type I and are5
indexed by a shift parameter s. For example, during vacation periods, the
cost for each individual is shifted downward relative to that at other times.
Given a price P for lift rides, all individuals with a cost c(i) less than
the benefits from skiing, U{D(P)J -P'D(P),choose to participate. Thus, the
number of individuals N who choose to ski is given by
(1) N =N(P)=c1{U[D(P)J-P.D(P)).
By the strict concavity of U, the benefits from skiing fall with an increase
in the price per ride P, so the number of skiers falls as well. A downward
shift in the distribution of fixed costs (as on weekends) raises the value of
N for a given P.
By specifying that the ski areas are competitive, we mean that each is
small enough that its actions have a negligible impact on aggregate
quantities. In this model (though not in those that follow) competitive
behavior implies that firms take prices as given. Equilibrium requires that
the total capacity of rides, Jx, equal the total number demanded, qN—that is,
(2)JxD(P).N(P) =D(P)•c1{U[D(P)JP.D(P)}
For a given value of Jx, this condition determines the equilibrium price per
ride P. As one would expect, the price P falls with an increase in total
capacity, Jx, and rises with an increase in the level of demand such as that
generated from a downward shift in the level of fixed costs c.6
Over the longer term the model also determines the size of the industry,
Jx. This scale depends on the cost of building new capacity (either more
firms J or more rides per firm x) and on the distribution of returns, as
determined by equation (2) and the distribution function of the shift
parameter s.
2.2 Equilibrium with Lift Tickets
We now show how the equilibrium described above can be implemented using
an entry fee (i.e. an all-day lift ticket) and a price per ride set equal to
zero. Let n. denote the price of a lift ticket at area j,andlet n. be the
number of skiers who ski there. Given the total capacity x, the maximum
number of rides per skier will be q. =x/n..In equilibrium each person will
desire a greater number of rides than x/n. at the zero marginal cost implied
by lift-ticket pricing. Hence there is no problem in getting the customers to
accept the quantity of rides available. tn fact, people will queue up to
receive the rides.
The assumption that the cost c(i) is quasi-fixed implies that an
individual cares only about the outlay on skiing, c(i) +n.,,and the number
of rides available,q3 =x/n3.
It is important for our analysis that
individuals do not care directly about the time spent waiting in lift lines,
or about how the rides are distributed throughout the day. They would prefer
shorter lift lines because they would prefer more rides; but given a fixed
number of rides, they are indifferent between spending time outdoors in line
or indoors in the lodge. We discuss these assumptions more fully in section
2.3.7
Suppose that individual I considers the choice between areas j and k.
Since the cost c(I) of going skiing is assumed to be the same for each area,
the individual will be Indifferent between j and k if the total utility from
skiing minus the cost of the lift ticket is the same. Since the number of
lift rides per skier available at area jisdetermined by the number of people
who attend,q3 =c/flj
the equilibrium condition for individuals to be
indifferent between areas can be written as
(3) U(x/n.) -= U(x/nk)-
Inthis equilibrium areas do not take the price T. for lift tickets as
given. Suppose that each area is negligibly small relative to the size of the
market. Then each area can choose its lift-ticket price ir., but the number of
individuals skiing at the area will adjust so that the net utility from
skiing, U(x/n) -n.,is the same as that offered at all other areas.
Competitive behavior in this context implies that each area takes as given the
net utility from skiing. By differentiating net utility with respect to
and flj we can evaluate the response of the number of skiersn to changes in
the lift-ticket priceit3. Written in terms of elasticities, we have
dnn_________ —
(x/n.)iY(x/n.)
Since costs are assumed to depend on the fixed level of capacity x, and
not on the number of skiers, each ski area seeks to maximize its revenues,8
fl3flj taking as given the relation between the ticket price and the number of
skiers implied by equation (4). As usual, maximization of revenue requires
that the elasticity of customersflj with respect to the price be equal to





The left side of equation (5) is the lift-ticket price,
ii,dividedby
the number of rides per person at area j,q =x/n.
For convenience, define
the effective price per ride under lift-ticket pricing as
(6) =
Theright side of equation (5) is the marginal valuation of' rides, U',
evaluated at the quantity q.. Because the demand curve D(') is simply the
inverse of marginal utility, each person at area jendsup with the quantity
from the demand curve q. that corresponds to the effective price per ride
Although people wait in line and face an explicit marginal cost for rides of
zero, the results are as if each skier gets the quantity of rides that he or
she would demand at an explicit market price per ride .Thatis, equation
(5) can be rewritten as
(7) qj =D().9
Each area sets prices according to equation (5) and each must provide a
given level of the net utility term, U(x/n.) -n..Since the areas have the
same capacity x and are otherwise identical, they end up with the same values
for the lift-ticket price, u. =ur,the number of customers,n =N/J,and the
effective price per ride, .=
Tocomplete the description of the equilibrium, it remains to determine
the value of the common lift-ticket price, iT, or equivalently of the effective
price per ride .Wecan analyze the decision to incur the fixed cost to go
skiing just as In the first model, except that the explicit price per ride P
A isnow replaced by the effective price P. (Recall from equation (7) that
people end up with the quantity of rides that they would demand at this
price.) The analogue to equation (1)—which determined the total number of
skiers N in the first model—is
(8)N =N()=c{U[D()J
-
Inequilibrium the effective price per rideis such as to equate the total
capacity for rides, Jx, to the total demand, qN, which implies
(9) Jx =D().N()=D()'c{U{D()J-
Sincethis is the same equation that determined the price per ride P in the
first equilibrium, the effective pricetakes on the same value. Finally,
equations (6) and (7) imply that the common lift-ticket price is determined by
the effective price per ride,10
A A A
(10)n =Pq=P.D(P).
Since the equilibrium with lift-ticket pricing yields an effective price
A
per ride P equal to the explicit price per ride P in the first equilibrium,
skiers receive the same number of rides at the same cost in each case. The
same people end up participating, and each ski area receives the same revenue.
The equality of andflj across areas is special to the example here.
Section 3 shows that and n can vary across areas If' there are differences
in skiers' preferences, U.(), or in the characteristics of ski areas. What
does generalize is the result that the lift-ticket equilibrium can replicate
the quantities and effective prices from a ride-ticket equilibrium where
prices are set equal to marginal valuations and no quantity constraints are
present.
In the longer run context where the capacity Jx Is variable, suppliers
have the same incentives to Invest under lift-ticket pricing as they did in
the first model. Specifically, the effective price per ride correctly
corresponds to the skiers' marginal valuation of rides, U'. Thus—given our
assumption that people care about the number of rides but not directly about
the time spent in line—there are no Inefficiencies implied by the existence
of queues, which reflect the explicit marginal cost of zero for rides.
Allocative decisions are still based on the proper shadow price, =U'(q).
Although the lift-ticket equilibrium is fundamentally only a repackaged
form of the original competitive equilibrium, the superficial appearances are
strikingly different. Specifically, the lift-ticket solution features11
quantity rationing by means of queues, as well as ticket prices thatseem to
be set by firms with market power. A regulatormight note with Concern that
the "demand' for lift tickets at each area is thedownward-sloping curve
determined by equation (4), and that each area maximizesrevenue
subject to this curve.
2.3 Ride Tickets versus Lift Tickets
Given the assumptions so far, there Is no basis forpredicting which of
the two forms of pricing will be observed. They lead to identicalallocations
and effective prices. Ski areas charging on aper ride basis could coexist
with others charging on a lift-ticket basis. Onecan readily verify that an
area could also use a combination of a lift ticket (i.e. anentry fee) and a
charge per ride.
The description of the world implicit in this model missesimportant
features of reality. For some aspects, such as the determinationof the price
per ride P or ,thesefeatures may be unimportant. However, in the choice
between two otherwise equivalent pricing schemes, thesefeaturesmay be
decisive. The most obvious elements neglected so farare:
a) the costs that must be incurred by an area to enforceContracts,
for example, to avoid the theft of rides;
b) rides are not homogenous, but are heterogeneous goods Indexedby
the time of day and by Contingencies such as breakdowns andarrivals
of skiers;
c) time spent waiting in line Is likely to have a positive
opportunity cost.12
We can conjecture what the Inclusion of these features would imply.
Given the allocation of rides common to the two kinds of equilibria (and to
any mixture of these two), the form of pricing that minimizes the neglected
costs will be selected. Ride-ticket pricing will generally have higher
monitoring and set-up costs than lift-ticket pricing. Since it would be
extremely expensive to set up a complete series of markets In time and.
contingency specific rides and to enforce contracts written in this form, some
amount of queuing would be expected even under pure ride pricing. On the
other hand, lift-ticket pricing imposes costs in terms of time. Relative to a
system with an extensive system of reservations for lift rides at specified
times, each individual must spend more time at a ski area to achieve the given
allocation of rides. However, if the typical skier's fixed cost, c, for
getting to the ski area Is large, then this last element would be relatively
unimportant.
As far as we know, ski areas use only the lift-ticket form of pricing. 01
(1971) describes how Disneyland once followed a combination form of pricing
with an entry fee and a per ride fee.(In contrast to the explanation offered
here, 01 Interprets this scheme as evidence of market power.) Disneyland has
since shifted to a pure entry fee. We take these observations as evidence
that the costs of allocating rides using ride tickets are higher than those
using entry fees. Presumably the cost of Implementing reservations and
collecting ride tickets outweigh the value of the savings in the time required
to acquire a given number of rides. This outcome is especially likely If' the
lump-sum costs of participating are large, and If time spent at a ski area or
amusement park is valued for its own sake.13
2.4 Shifts in Demand
The foregoing arguments demonstrate that theremay be little or no
deadweight loss associated with the use of lift-ticket pricing, rather than
ride-ticket pricing. But the results do not yet explain why ticketprices
would be "sticky." Over the course of a season, variations in the shift
parameter s—such as those reflecting weekends and vacation periods—cause
predictable changes in demand. Lift lines vary markedly, as do prices for
accommodations, but lift-ticket prices apparently change relatively little.
As one would expect, equation (9) implies that the effective priceper
A
ride P varies in the same direction as the level of demand, with the
sensitivity depending inversely on the magnitude of the price elasticity of
A A
the overall demand for rides (that is, of D(P)•N(p)). Thus, the effective
price per ride is high when the level of demand is high, and vice versa.
However, the price n for a lift ticket does not necessarilyvary in the same
direction as the level of demand. From equation (10), the effectiveprice per
ride is =n/q=rn/x.Even with ii(andx) fixed, the extra crowding
associated with the increase in n (which equals N/J) itselfgenerates a higher
A effective price per ride. The lift-ticket price irincreaseswhen P increases
only if the associated fall in rides per person, x/n =D(),is less than
equiproportional. Using equation (10), the effect of a change inon is
(11)dn/d =D()(1+ 0,
where <0is the elasticity of rides demanded per person with respect to14
the price per ride. If this elasticity Is greater than -1 (i.e. less than I
in absolute value), r rises along withand, hence, with the level of demand.
But if the elasticity is less than -1 (i.e. greater than I In absolute value),
n falls whenincreases. Finally, if the elasticity is close to -1, n shows
little sensitivity to fluctuations in demand. In this case competitive forces
are consistent with nearly constant lift-ticket prices, even though the times
of peak demand exhibit lines that are much longer than those during non-peak
times.
This result suggests an additional advantage to lift-ticket pricing. If
the elasticity of demand for rides per person is close to -1, it is
unnecessary to incur the "menu costs' of changing the stated price at a ski
area in response to changes in demand. The effective price per ride changes
in nearly the right way if the price of lift tickets is held constant.
The same mechanism may explain why the explicit prices for goods such as
airline tickets and restaurants often do not vary betweeen peak and off-peak
periods. At busy times the effective amount of service diminishes because
planes and restaurants are more crowded. Thus, the price per effective unit
of service rises automatically If the explicit price is held fixed. Under
such circumstances, the results with fixed explicit prices may roughly
replicate the equilibrium with a flexible price per effective unit of service.
(This flexible price would rise at peak times.)
Constant lift-ticket prices work exactly only if the elasticity of the
demand for rides per person equals -1. But if the menu costs are large enough
to play a decisive role in the choice of the pricing format, a two-part
pricing scheme can be implemented to avoid price changes even when the15
elasticity differs from -1. This consideration does not appear to be relevant
for ski areas, where per ride charges do not seem to be used, but may be a
factor in the choice of such a scheme by some amusement parks.
To see how this would work, consider an amusement park with capacity x,
which charges an entry fee iianda price per ride r. Exactly as was the case
for a ski area, if the park is small relative to the industry as a whole, it
takes the net utility level for attending the park, U[D()J -'D(),as
given. Hence, the park cannot change the effective price pez ride
However,it does not take as given the number of people attending or the price
of the admission ticket. When n people visit the park, the supply of rides
per person Is x/n and the effective price per ride is r +nn/x.Since the
effective price must equaland since the number of rides demanded must equal




For fixed r, this equation determines how iimustvary with the changes in
that are induced by changes in demand. The analogue to equation (10) above is
(13) n =(-r)D(),
1Note that, since >r, the demand at the explicit pricer, D(r), exceeds the
quantity available, q=D(). Therefore, although the explicit price is now
positive, the demanders still queue up for the available rides. These queues
typically applied at Disneyland, even when ride tickets were used.16





Suppose that we consider small fluctuations in demand that induce
fluctuations In the effective pricearound some level .Let be the
elasticity of the demand for rides with respect to the effective price. Then,
for a given value of the price per ride r can be chosen so that
AP-r AA 2 dir
ADis equal to -1 when evaluated at P =
P0.Then —willbe zero
P dP
when evaluated at and it will be small in a neighborhood of .Forsmall
fluctuations in demand, an equilibrium with constant prices r and ir will be
approximately equivalent to the conventional equilibrium with no entry fee and
a fluctuating price P per ride.
3. Elaborations of the Ski Area Model
In Section 2, ski areas were identical and agents differed only in terms
of the fixed cost c(i); conditional on participation, they too were
identical. In this section we Illustrate the extent to which the previous
results hold when there are differences in characteristics of ski areas and in
individuals' preferences for ski runs. Differences among ski areas lead to
results that complement those above about sticky prices. The conditions that
2The value of r would be negative if were less than 1 in absolute value.17
cause lift-ticket prices to be invariant with demand also cause these prices
to be the same at areas with different characteristics. However, differences
in preferences can lead to differences in ticket pricesamong areas, even if
the areas are identical.
3.1. Differences Among Ski Areas.
Consider a pool of N identical skiers who have decided togo skiing.
These skiers choose among J areas, indexed by j. Let b. denote the cost for
any skier to travel to area j; for example, b. could be determined by the
distance of the area from a major urban center. Ski areasmay also differ in
terms of the length or 'quality' of their ski runs. We represent these
differences by assuming that area j has the capacity x, which is measured in
terms of numbers of runs of a specified length (or quality). When modeled in
this way, the differences across areas inx turn out to add little to the
analysis. For a given value of the transportation cost, b.., an increase inx.
leads solely to a one-for-one change in the number of skiers who come toarea
j. That is, variations in x. do not lead to variations across areas in the
.3
number of standardized ski runs per skier or in the priceper standardized ski
run.
As before, is the lift-ticket price and q. =x/n.is the number of
rides (of standardized length) per person at area j. For an individual to be
Indifferent between areas j and k, it must be that
(15) U(q) -- b.U(q) -- bk.18
For each area, this condition implies that a change in the lift-ticket price
causes the number of skiers to adjust so that the net utility from going
skiing, U(x./n) -iT, remainsconstant. In contrast to the case considered
in Section 2.2, this net utility will not be the same for all areas; it varies
one for one with the cost b. But for a given area, it is invariant to the
choice ofn3. Area j maximizes revenue subject to the constraint that net
utility remain constant. Then, by the argument leading to equation (5), the
first-order condition for the revenue maximization problem of the firm is
(16) =U'(q.).q.






Suppose that area j is closer than area k, so that b <bk.Since U is
strictly concave, U(q) -U'(q).qis increasing in q, and q. < Thus,
closer areas will be more crowded and offer fewer rides per person. Since U'
is the inverse demand curve for lift rides, the effective price per ski run,
=U'(q.),will be higher at the closer area. But whether the lift-ticket
price is higher or lower depends again on the elasticity of the demand
curve for rides per person. If the elasticity equals -1 in a neighborhood of
the equilibrium number of ski runs, lift-ticket prices will be identical at
all areas.
In spite of the explicit terms of trade used by participants, the
equilibrium here is one that equates the supply and demand for ski runs of19
standardized length, not the supply and demand for all-day lift tickets. The
last result illustrates the importance of this distinction.If' one thinks in
terms of a demand for lift tickets, one is naturally led to the incorrect
conclusion that the ticket price should vary one for one with the costb. so
that 1T÷b would be the same for all areas.If this total cost of going
skiing were the same at all areas, and the number of ski runsper person q.
were also the same, individuals would be indifferent betweenareas; that is,
equation (15) would be satisfied.
To see why this cannot be an equilibrium, it is useful to consider the
analysis from the viewpoint of a social planner. By the first welfare
theorem, a competitive equilibrium with ride tickets is Pareto optimal.
3There are two equivalentways to see why this is so. The first is to note
that linearity of utility in other goods effectively converts the Pareto
problem into a problem with transferable utility. Therefore, the optimum must
maximize total utility. Redistribution takes place by means of transfers of
income. Alternatively, note that the function 13(q) measures the area under
the demand curve for lift rides. The sum of these functions Is the usual
measure of aggregate consumer surplus, and quasi-linear utility was chosen
precisely because It permits a simple Marshallian analysis of our problem.
Because we assume that total utility is linear in income, we can calculate the
unique, Pareto optimal allocation of ski rides by maximizing an unweightedsum
over Individuals of the utility from skiing minus the cost of going skiing.3
With N identical skiers and J ski areas indexed on the interval [O,J}, the
planner must choose the number of skiersn at each area. The problem is then





subject to the constraint
J
5n.dj=N.
At the suggested allocation whereq =x./n.is the same at all areas,
individuals get the same utility from skiing at each area. At the margin, the
planner could shift skiers from distant areas to closer ones with no loss in
satisfaction from skiing, but in so doing would reduce total transportation
costs. Thus this cannot be the social optimum. Using the substitution
=x/n.,
a quick calculation demonstrates that the first-order condition
for this problem is precisely equation (17). To support this optimum, it
makes no difference whether areas charge the price per standardized ski run of
P. =U'(q.),or offer q. runs at a price n. =
The next section shows that differences in individual preferences cause
lift-ticket prices to vary among areas. But to the extent that these
differences are small, the present observation permits a kind of
cross-sectional check on the explanation proposed above for the stickiness of
lift-ticket prices. Many explanations can be offered for price stickiness
over time, but it is harder to explain cross-sectional stickiness. If the
demand curve for ski runs per person is close to being unit elastic, then
there should be less variation in lift-ticket prices than in the number of
skiers or the length of lift lines, both in comparisons over time and among21
areas at a point in time. In both dimensions, it will appear that quantities
respond more than prices.
3.2. Differences in Preferences
Suppose now that utility as a function of lift rides, U1(q), differs
among individuals. At an effective price per ride ,thedemand for rides per
person, D1(), also differs. All of the previous equilibria deliver the same
number of rides to all skiers at a given area by means of a queuing mechanism.
Since this mechanism does not discriminate among people with different
preferences, It cannot allocate different numbers of rides per day, D.(), to
them. To achieve an allocation that does discriminate, different areas (or
different classes of tickets at a single area) will have to cater to different
types of individuals.
Consider again the case where ski areas are identical. For simplicity we
deal with only two types of consumers: there are N1 agents with preferences
tJ1(q) =u(q),and N2 agents with preferences U2(q) =cu(q),where a >1.
Thus, type 2 indIviduals are more avid skiers. Think again of a social
planner, who Is free to allocate skiers among areas. Assume that type one
skiers are allocated to areas in the interval [O,J1J, and type 2 skiers to the
interval [J1,J]. Simple arguments show that the number of skiers should be
the same for all areas In a given interval. Since the total capacity of areas
serving type 1 skiers is J1x, and that serving type 2 skiers is [J-J1]x, the






As one would expect from an analysis of the demand for rides, the first-order
condition for this problem implies that the marginal utility of a ride is the
same at each area, U(q1) =t(g2).
As in the analysis of Section 2, competition among areas using
lift-ticket pricing will lead to lift-ticket prices =U(q1)•q1,and
=U(q2).q2.In general, these prices need not be the same. In the case
where u(q) =ln(q),so that the demand curve for each type of individual is
unit elastic, we have q2 oq1 and =
an1.In this case, the areas catering
to type two skiers charge a higher lift-ticket price and offer more rides per
person. In general, the areas with high ticket prices are less crowded and
attract more avid skiers (that is, people who are willing to pay more per ski
run).
Each ski area still meets the effective price per ride,
=U(q1)
=U(q2),just as if it charged this price directly. Moreover,
each area faces a given capacity constraint x. Since x/n, the number of
rides per person, times ,theeffective price per ride, must equal the ticket
price n, the number of customers who show up as a function of the ticket price
is
(19) n =XP/ir.
Therefore, over the range of values for that are observed in equilibrium,
each area faces a demand in terms of numbers of skiers,flj. that has an
elasticity of precisely -l with respect to the lift-ticket price ir..
Correspondingly, the areas revenue, nn =x,is invariant with respect to23
the choice of the ticket price from the set of ticket prices that are
observed In equilbrluin. The areas are indifferent between charging a high
price and catering with short lines to the skiers who demand lots of' rides per
person, or charging a low price and servicing with long lines those who demand
ew rides.
This equiproportional change in the number of skiers in response to a
change In the lift-ticket price does not depend on the elasticity of the
aggregate demand curve for lift rides. It obtains whenever a range of
lift-ticket prices is observed in equilibrium. As an area changes its
lift-ticket price, It also changes the entire class of skiers that choose to
patronize it.
Except for the restriction to a finite number of individual types, and
hence a finite number of observed prices jr., the lift-ticket equilibrium in
the presence of different tastes resembles the equilibrium with differentiated
products and hedonic prices as described In Rosen (1974). Each type of ski
area offers a different type of skiing experience, Indexed by q., the number
of ski runs available per skier. With identical competitive producers, profit
is invariant to the type of good offered, and the price function Tr(q) traces
out the structure of the demand side of the market. In Rosen's model,
producers with no market power choose the type of good offered and the price
charged from the locus described by ir(q). Here, the departure from the
appearance of price-taking behavior Is even sharper. Firms simply choose a
price n; quality adjusts endogenously. It Is interesting to note that, until
recently, the Metro in Paris used a similar scheme to sort people by taste.
Purchasers of first-class tickets rode in separate cars, which were not24
physically different from second-class cars, except that the first-class cars
were less crowded (in equilibrium).4 Roughly speaking, individuals with a
stronger preference for ski rides or with a greater distaste for congestion
are willing to pay more for the opportunity to pay more.
4. pp1IcatIon to the_Labor Market
In this section we apply the paradigm of ski-lift pricing to the labor
market. In this context a fully flexible wage rate corresponds to a flexible
price per lift ride. The case of a lift ticket relates to alternative methods
of labor compensation, such as profit-sharing schemes. From the standpoint of
an individual worker, the firm's total profit looks like a ski operator's
total capacity. In particular, the amount that each person gets (share of
profits or number of lift rides) varies inversely with the number of other
people who show up.(Profit per worker falls with more workers as long as the
average product of labor exceeds the marginal product.) But, as in the ski
example, competition among firms causes the parameters of the profit-sharing
rule to adjust so as to reproduce the outcomes that would emerge under
flexible wages. Further, at least as an approximation, It Is satisfactory to
have fixed wages and fixed parameters for the sharing formula. Thus—even in
the absence of any long-term contracts—these kinds of rigidities need not
imply any inefficiencies.
4
We are told that the abolition of this vestige of the class system was one of
the promises made In the presidential campaign of Francois Mitterand. After
his election, a compromise was reached whereby this system was not allowed to
operate during the morning and evening periods of peak demand (where it
presumably would be most useful), but remained in effect during the middle of
the day.25
Suppose that each of J identical, competitive firms has the production
function,
(20) Y =A.F(n),
where Y is output, A is a technological shift parameter, and n is the number
of workers. We assume that each worker works a fixed number of hoursper day.
Given the real wage rate w, profit maximization for each firm entails
(21) F'(n) =w/A.
Equation (21) determines each firm's labor demand. Aggregate labor demand is
the multiple J of the demand per firm.
The economy has a population of M potential workers. Those who work
consume the quantity q =w+R,where R is non-wage (profit) income. Those who
do not work consume the amount q =R.Utility for person i Is given by
U[q(i)J -c(i),where c(i) is the reservation wage. As before, we think of
the index I as running over the continuum, [0,MJ, with c(i) increasing in 1.
Assuming that w and R are the same for all persons, individual i works if
IJ(w÷r) -U(R)exceeds c(i). Hence, aggregate labor supply can be written as
(22) N =c1[U(w+r)-U(R)}.
For a given distribution of reservations wages and a given value of R, the
slope of the labor-supply function Is (c1)' >0.
The equation of aggregate labor suply to aggregate labor demand
determines the market-clearing values of the wage rate, w*, and employment, N*
(which we assume to be less than the potential population M). Then each
firm's employment is n* =N*/J.We assume that variations In wages rates and
employment reflect shifts in the technological parameter A, and we make
assumptions on preferences which guarantee that an increase in A causes an26
increase In employment. Equations (21) and (22) imply that an increase in A
leads to an increase in w. If the production function F is strictly concave,
profits will also increase, which we assume raises the value of R for each
potential worker. In equation (22), an Increase in w, with R held constant,
causes N to increase by the usual substitution effect. An increase In R
causes N to fall by the positive income effect on the demand for leisure. We
assume that the substitution effect from a higher w is dominant, which Is
especially likely if the technological disturbance Is temporary. If we define
to be the elasticity of x with respect to y, it follows that
0and 0 A<
For concreteness we focus on technological shocks, but we could equally
well have assumed other types of exogenous shocks. We have also assumed
implicitly that the market for goods is competitive, but this assumption Is
also not crucial. We could have used instead the kind of monopolistically
competitive market structure assumed by Weitzman (1985). All that matters for
our analysis Is that workers and firms lack market power in the labor market,
and that employment and the marginal product of workers move together.
As In the ski-lift example, the competitive equilibrium in the labor
market can be supported by pricing mechanisms other than the obvious one of
freely flexible wage rates per worker. For example, assume that the wage rate
is fixed at some value w' <w.The wage w' parallels the explicit price per
ride, r, in the ski-lift case. Therefore, w' =0corresponds to pure
lift-ticket pricing, where r =0.
5From equation (21), >0implies <0,which implies'7wA <•27
Assume now that a worker's total compensation consists of thewage w'
plus a bonus B. We want to consider specifications of B that allowthe labor
market to reproduce the competitive outcomes, despite therigidity of explicit
wages. Let A0 denote the value of A at an initial position for theeconomy.






In order for the compensation under the two schemes tovary in the same way
with small departures of A fromA0, it is also necessary that
(24) '7w'÷B,A =
wherethese elasticities are evaluated at A =
A0.If equation (24) holds at
the initial position, then the total compensation, w'4-B,reacts in the same





Hence, if 0 <w'<w,the bonus B must be proportionately more sensitive than
w to changes in A. Therefore, the resultssuggest tying the bonus to
something that is correlated with but more volatile than w.
One candidate for this tie, proposed by Weitzman (1985), isthe firm's
profit. In this case the bonus per worker could be determined from thelinear
profit-sharing formula,
(26) B =(/n)[A•F(n)-nw' --28
where a and eareparameters. If a and/or O were flexible, then—as in the
ski-lift example—competition would ensure the adjustments necessary to
support the employment level n* at each firm. If a andare restricted to be
constants (that is, invariant with respect to A), then the necessary values of
these parameters follow from equations (23) and (25). In particular, for a
given value of w', we can show that 0 <a<Iand 6 Further, given the
other parameters of the problem, it is possible to choose a value of w' <w
such that 13 =0,in which case the profit-sharing rule takes the simple form
described by Weitzman.7 In any event, If a and 13 are such that equations (23)
and (25) are satisfied, then—at least locally—the fluctuations in total
compensation correspond to the fluctuations in w, and thereby support the
variations In n* that would have resulted with flexible wages.
In this solution workers face the explicit wage w' <w(w' =0is
possible), but also get a share of the profits. In deciding whether to work,
each person looks only at his own total compensation and neglects the fact











(13 <0applies If w5 =w'.)All expressions above are evaluated at some
initial position, denoted before by the superscript 0.
7However, the necessary value of w' could be negative. See the formula for
13/n in n.6 above.29
that his participation reduces the profit distributed to the otherworkers
(which occurs if the marginal product of labor is below theaverage product).
This interaction parallels the negative effect of an additionalskier's
participation on the rides available for others. Nevertheless, as inour
previous example for skiing, the appropriate profit-sharing schemereproduces
the results for employment and total compensationper worker that would arise
under flexible wages.(This result is exact if a and/or ,G are flexible and
determined by the competitive interaction of firms. If a andare fixed, but
at the appropriate values, then the result holds locally.)
It also follows that firms would eagerly hire more workers thanare
available at the going wage w' (< w*) and the prescribed terms forsharing
profits. (This result parallels the eagerness of skiers to queueup for lift
rides.) But more workers than n do not present themselves because the total
compensation, w'+B, would then fall below the value w, which is the
reservation wage of the marginal worker (when total employment is N* =Jn*).
As with flexible wages, employment is determined so that labor's marginal
product equals the competitive wage w. In other words, profits are maximized
subject to the constraint that firms pay each worker a total compensation that
equals the marginal worker's reservation wage. Thus, the outcomes are Pareto
optimal despite sticky wages and the apparent common-property problem
associated with the sharing of profits. Even though the marginal cost to the
firm of an additional worker is less under the profit-sharingarrangement, the
equilibrium level of employment is the same as that with flexiblewages.
Correspondingly, the firms in each regime face the appropriate shadow price of
labor (w*), and thereby make correct decisions with respect to investment in
capital, entry and exit, etc.30
A profit-sharing scheme will not work if disturbances sometimes cause
employment and wages to move in opposite directions. For example, this
pattern would emerge from shifts to workers' reservation wages. Even barring
such disturbances, the results do not imply that profit sharing is superior to
other schemes that allow the bonus (and thereby total labor compensation) to
move along with w. Also, the analysis does not suggest that a framework with
fixed wages and a flexible bonus (related, say, to profits) would be superior
to a setup with flexible wages. As was the case for ski areas, the choice of
compensation scheme must be based on elements of reality that are excluded
from this model.
One element that is not a candidate for explaining a preference for
profit sharing is a pure menu cost of changing the amount of compensation
received by each worker. Total compensation per worker is the same at every
point in time under any equivalent scheme, and there Is no reason to believe
that it is easier to vary bonuses than to vary wages. A more promising
approach may be to consider asymmetric information. If profits are observable
by workers, but a technological shock like A is not, then problems of
enforcement may lead to the selection of a contract that is contingent on
profits rather than on A. But this line of argument suggests that an
observable like total sales, which is less susceptible to manipulation by
firms, might be an even better choice. In any case, a call for the widespread
use of profit-sharing contracts and for subsidies to encourage their adoption,
as in Weitzman (1985), requires further analysis of why this System is more
attractive than alternatives, and why firms and workers do not settle
voluntarily on the preferred format for pricing.REFERENCES
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